ABSTRACT
When ‘a group of personal failures animated by a desire to destroyliberalism and pluralism in Germany and grouped around afanatical, charismatic and unstable leader took over the reins of one of the most sophisticated governmental structures in Europe’ (Orlow, II, 1973: 17) the consequences were bound to be chaotic and to defy any rational analysis. Despite the veneer of efficiency that so impressed the majority of contemporary observers, in retrospect it is clear that the Third Reich was a bedlam of rival hierarchies, competing centres of power and ambiguous chains of command. There were four distinct centres of power: the single party monopoly of the Nazi Party, the SS, the central government machine and the personal absolutism of Hitler. The Nazi Party failed to dictate policy in the way the Bolshevik Party was able to in Russia, although it was nevertheless a considerable power in the state that could not be ignored. The traditional civil service and the ministries initially retained much of their influence and the subsequent rivalries created by the ambiguous dualism of party and state could only be resolved by Hitler himself.
