ABSTRACT
Naturally, as time has passed and a reasonably clear picture has begun to emerge of what grammars of particular languages
constructed in this framework are like, attention has begun to shift from questions of descriptive adequacy to the issue of universals (see 1 .5, and 2.2. 1,2.2.5 and 2.3 . I for a similar development in Chomsky's theory). However, proponents of GPSG are for the most part very cautious about attributing psychological reality to grammars or assuming the innateness of universal constructs. The view is taken that in the absence of independent evidence claims of this sort are simply pretentious. The analogy which Chomsky seeks to press with the 'hard' sciences is dismissed as methodological prejudice, and proposed grammatical constructs are regarded as the artefacts of particular theoretical perspectives whose merits can be assessed in terms of how well they fit the facts and by reference to the usual criteria of elegance and simplicity, but which have no analogues in the real world.
