ABSTRACT
Among the major political crises in Central Europe prior to 1989 only the last one, in Poland during 1980-81, did not see the use of Soviet military force. Even then, though, the supposed threat of its use was a major factor justifying Jaruzelski’s imposition of martial law and deployment of national security forces. The Soviet military had clearly played a major part in establishing communist power in Central Europe after 1945 and in m aintaining it in the face of successive uprisings against Soviet-backed dictatorship - and even of attempts to reform the mechanisms of communist rule from above. The role of the Red Army in establishing communist power had been decisive in Poland and Hungary, but significant more as a background condition and part of a critical international context for Czechoslovakia. Soviet force was later decisive in crushing opposition to communist rule and ensuring its survival in orthodox form in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was of determ inant significance throughout in East Germany, where around 400,000 Soviet troops were instrum ental in m aintaining the communist regime - having also overseen the formation of the German Democratic Republic and underwritten its survival as a separate state. When, indeed, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from German soil later came on to the agenda it was reported that as much as 10 per cent of GDR territory had been under the direct control of Soviet military authorities.
