ABSTRACT

In January 1942, the Stavka met to discuss plans for a counter-offensive to drive the Wehrmacht away from Leningrad and Moscow and to crush the German forces in the south. Zhukov argued in favour of exploiting the weaknesses of Army Group Centre and insisted that offensives to the north and south would be doomed to failure. Zhukov agreed with general staff's assessment of the importance of the central sector but argued that offensive should be mounted to wipe out the massive German bridgehead in front of Moscow from Rzhev to Demyansk. In a two-pronged attack to the north and south of Kursk, the Soviets created a wide salient to the south of which lay Kharkov. The general staff and the Stavka agreed that the new German offensive would be directed against Moscow, in spite of detailed intelligence information coming from 'Lucy' and 'Werther' in Berlin and Switzerland showing that the Germans intended to strike in the south.