ABSTRACT
Euthanasia has been used colloquially to describe an easing of the pains of life to ensure that an older or severely disabled person is enabled to die with some dignity, as a means of curtailing their suffering. Such acts can be viewed from a range of perspectives and thus remain contested, viewed by some as deviant and by others as desirable, or legitimate under certain circumstances. These competing views rely on the particular social and legal context and the perspective of those receiving such treatment to give them meaning. Early labels implied a positive process, with the term ‘euthanasia’ deriving from two Greek words, eu (good) and thanatos (death). That is only one contextual perception. In the twentieth century, the concept absorbed more brutal, self-interested dimensions. Euthanasia encompasses the intentional killing of those in a subordinate position. It no longer automatically assumes the practice of killing for the latter’s own alleged benefit. Euthanasia can be diverse in form, including requiring the involvement of a second person. It includes the deliberate killing of a subordinate group such as ‘mental defectives’ under the Nazis (especially in the killing camp of Hadamar). But it also covers the action of a hospital doctor who places a ‘DNR’ (Do Not Resuscitate) sign on a patient’s door. It includes therefore both sins of commission — deliberate disposal of the ‘Other’ — and sins of omission — speeding up the dying process by not maintaining a patient’s survival, for example by not providing 113necessary sustenance. Confusingly, in the latter example, the primary actor may also conduct acts of commission by furnishing, for example, an excessive amount of a pain-killing drug.
