ABSTRACT
The existence of freedom or of its opposite is clearly a question of fact which must therefore be examined in the manner attempted in this chapter. The problems of freedom, crucial for all moral theory, are also of outstanding difficulty, as an age-long discussion has shown. We need not hope to resolve them, but we may diminish the difficulty by removing some of the commoner misunderstandings, and perhaps describe, in general, something of the degree of freedom which moral theory seems to require. The chapter begins with a psychological discussion and pass to an ethical one. Determinism makes us the captives of the past and forbids hope for the future. It is the 'dull rattling off of a chain whose links were forged many ages ago'. It therefore stifles moral achievement and aspiration. Tychism is ultimately the principle of chaos the theory of a disorderly self in a disorderly world. This makes morality chaotic, too.
