ABSTRACT
Introduction The aim of this chapter is to examine the efforts of the EU to advance SSR in the OPTs. As mentioned in Chapter 1, SSR has come to acquire a special position in every peace-and state-building project. SSR has been closely linked with the debates on peacebuilding, development, human security and good governance, rule of law, democracy and human rights. I have argued elsewhere that the security sector and its reform have become the ‘alpha and omega’ of the state-building process as in its absence, political, economic and cultural ‘building’ would be impossible (Bouris 2010b: 382). The chapter begins with an introduction to the concept of SSR, its origins and evolution. This part argues that there are different and often competing definitions with regard to SSR, which include either a narrow or a broader set of actors, who are involved in the process depending on what someone defines as the ‘security sector’. The second part deals with the EU’s approach to SSR. The EU has only recently developed guidelines and policy documents in the domain of SSR, drawing heavily on the OECD DAC extensive definition of the security system. The main documents that the EU has adopted in the field of SSR are the 2003 ESS, the 2005 EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR and the 2006 Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform, which were brought together under a common policy framework in 2006 (Collantes-Celador et al. 2008: 6). But, while the documents on SSR are relatively new, the EU’s initiatives on SSR are not. Through its policies over the years, the EU has promoted principles of SSR that were not ‘labelled’ as such. What the EU is missing is an effective integration of the different policies that exist. The third part aims at offering a brief analysis of the security sector in the OPTs, its establishment and its evolution. It is argued that the security sector in the OPTs has always been in disarray and has never been highly functional. By introducing the reader to the establishment of the Palestinian Security Services after the 1993 Oslo Accords, this part attempts to demonstrate the obstacles that have been created over the years. This is because of the policies of the occupying power, those of the international community, which has not followed a
comprehensive SSR approach, and, at the same time, the internal Palestinian policies, especially under the leadership of Yasser Arafat.1 The fourth part analyses the two civilian missions that the EU has deployed in the OPTs in order to help the PA reform its security sector, namely EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah. This part draws upon primary sources and material from (semi-structured) interviews that were conducted with policy makers in Brussels as well as with both missions’ staff on the ground. The fifth part provides a critical assessment of these missions by taking into account the difficult political environment on which these missions had to operate from their inception until now. Moreover, it offers criticism on the EU’s approach to SSR in the OPTs based on the criteria that were identified in the second chapter as necessary in order to test the effectiveness of the EU as a state-builder. It is argued that in reality, the EU has supported a technical and training approach rather than a genuine SSR process promoting democratic civilian oversight and accountability. Finally, it is argued that the main obstacle to the EU’s efficiency in the domain of SSR is the EU itself and this has significant reverberations not only for the security sector, but for the whole state-building project carried out in the OPTs.
