ABSTRACT
The discussion of existential presuppositions of descriptions has in general been restricted to definite descriptions. This chapter intends to discuss the problem of existential presuppositions in relation to a specific group of descriptions: those constituted by restrictive relative clauses. The difference between two possible semantic interpretations of the-NPs in relative constructions can be overtly manifested by replacing them with the unstressed demonstrative pronoun that, which can serve as the head NP determiner in the first but not in the second case. Smith's triple division of determiners into Indefinite, Specified and Unique does not reflect the complex structure of the whole system and blurs the pragmatically significant distinction between definiteness and specificity, which, as has been shown above, need not occur in a one-to-one relation. A systematic analysis of the relations between presuppositions and the choice of head NP determiner might perhaps result in some observations that would in turn contribute to our better understanding of language universals.
