ABSTRACT
This book has argued that the policy response to, and media coverage of, the crisis have reflected the interests and viewpoints of political and economic elites. During the housing bubble years, Irish banks borrowed heavily on international markets, which was facilitated by financial deregulation in Europe and the low interest rates brought about by the introduction of the euro. A significant portion of those funds was lent to the domestic property sector, leading to house price inflation. This development model was unsustainable but was preserved because it benefited the financial sector due to increased lending activity while other economic sectors profited thanks to the general high-pace growth. The political class reaped rewards in the form of taxes and electoral success brought about by popular satisfaction with levels of economic growth never seen before. The media sustained the bubble and rarely adopted a critical perspective. Yet, it would not have been difficult to look across the Irish Sea and consult The Economist magazine to obtain a different perspective, or to read David McWilliams and Morgan Kelly in the pages of Irish newspapers. One damning statistic is that between 2000 and 2007, Prime Time, a leading current affairs programme shown on RTÉ, the state broadcaster, talked about the housing bubble in only 1 per cent of its 700 shows, and most of those argued that there was no bubble.
