ABSTRACT
The context in which this difficulty is likely to arise is one in which a group has been discriminated against on the basis of morally irrelevant properties, but in which this discrimination has been recognized and at least pardy come to an end; and the question at hand concerns how the members of this group should now be treated. Should they now be treated like everyone else, ignoring their history, or should they be given special ad vantages because of past discrimination and injustices? There are a vari ety of considerations which are pertinent in answering this question, and I will deal with only one of these, the “reverse discrimination argument.” This argument claims that to extend special considerations to a formerly oppressed group will be to persist in the mistake of treating a morally ir relevant characteristic as if it were relevant. For if we take a morally irrel
evant characteristic (namely the characteristic which was the basis for the original discrimination) and use it as the basis for granting special consid erations or reparations, we will be treating the morally irrelevant as if it were relevant and still engaging in discrimination, albeit reverse discrimi nation. And hence, it is argued, the only proper stance toward groups who have suffered discrimination is one of strict impartiality.
