Post-2009

There is no question that the conflicting claims to islands and ocean areas within the South China Sea has dominated almost all discussions and undermined most attempts at regional cooperation on marine matters in the South China Sea. The bases of the legal/ political arguments for the claims of Brunei, China (People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China), Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam over the islands and ocean areas within the South China Sea, whether it be historic usage, discovery, occupation, proximity or a combination of these and other arguments, are well-known. ¹ The activities of the various actors respecting the islands and ocean areas have been extensively documented and analyzed. ² It is widely acknowledged that the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea involving the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of China ³ has had a stabilizing effect on State actions within the South China Sea ⁴ without, however, yielding much beyond a maintenance of the status quo respecting the conflicting ocean and insular claims. Subsequent to the Declaration there have been activities and statements that have provoked protests over interference with sovereignty and that the activity/statement is straying from the principles in the Declaration. ⁵ The South China Sea situation is further complicated by the interactions between the “two Chinas” – the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). While there has been a congruence of position across the Taiwan Strait on South China Sea matters, ⁶ Taiwan is an actor in the South China Sea, if for no other reason, that it occupies the largest of the Spratly Islands – Itu Aba or the Tai-Ping Island. ⁷ Since the commencement in 2008 of Ma Ying-Jeou’s Presidency, there has been a generally amicable political atmosphere across the Taiwan Strait. This has led to the PRC and Taiwan engaging in unprecedented levels of cooperation on the South China Sea issues, such as, a jointly proposed program of activity in a regional, multilateral, second-track forum (namely, the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea), a jointly published regional situation assessment report ⁸ through a bilateral mechanism, and confidence building measures informally proposed by various scholars from both sides.