Analysis

 

Adams, Sam. "Vietnam Cover-up: Playing War with Numbers; a CIA Conspiracy Against Its Own Numbers," Harper's Magazine (250), May 1975, 41-44, ff.

Controversial article by a CIA analyst charging that higher estimates of the North Vietnamese order of battle in 1967 were rejected for political reasons, in order to show progress in the war. (See Items 177, 178.)

Aspin, Les. "Debate Over U.S. Strategic Forecasts: A Mixed Record." Strategic Review, 7 (Summer 1980), 29-43.

This analysis by the one-time House Intelligence Committee member and future Secretary of Defense reviews strategic estimates of Soviet weapons developments and finds a "mixed record" of underestimates and overestimates. (See Items 155, 163, 174, 176.)

Bruemmer, Russell J. "Intelligence Community Reorganization: Declining the Invitation to Struggle." Yale Law Journal, 101 (1992), 867-891.

Former CIA General Counsel (1988-1990) argues in favor of a post-Cold War intelligence community reorganization, as well as a minimalist level of congressional participation.

Burton, Donald F. "Estimating Soviet Defense Spending." Problems of Communism, 32 (March-April 1983), 85-93.

An insider lays out CIA methodology for estimating Soviet defense spending, one of the most controversial exercises during the Cold War. (See Items 153, 163, 174, 176.)

Colby, William. "The Changing Role of Intelligence." World Outlook, 13 (Summer 1991), 77-90.

In an interview, the former DCI (1973-1976) offers his views on how intelligence should change in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Ford, Harold P. Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating. Washington: Defense Intelligence College, 1989.

One of CIA's most senior and most respected analysts assesses the history of national estimates since Pearl Harbor, as well as the broader problems raised by such estimates, their uses by policy makers, and likely future needs.

Freedman, Lawrence. U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977.

Limited by source classification, this remains a useful analysis of how the Intelligence Community estimative process addressed its major problem over the years.

Gates, Robert M. "The CIA and American Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs, 66 (1987/1988), 215-230.

The future DCI describes in broad terms the role played by analysis in the policy process. Especially interesting for his comments re charges of "politicized" intelligence.

Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1967.

A former OSS officer and intelligence theorist (see Item 20), Hilsman was Director of Intelligence and Research in the State Department at the outset of the Kennedy administration. Especially useful re the Cuban Missile Crisis, and other major foreign policy events of the period.

Hirschfeld, Thomas J., ed. Intelligence and Arms Control: A Marriage of Convenience. Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 1987.

Conference proceedings in which experienced practitioners (Colby, Inman, Rostow, et al.) discuss the role played by intelligence throughout the arms control process, from threat assessment, to shaping proposal, to negotiating, to monitoring compliance.

Leadbetter, Col. Wyland F., Jr. and Cdr. Stephen J. Bury. "Prelude to Desert Storm: The Politicization of Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 6 (1993), 43-54.

Argues that, despite charges to the contrary, the CIA did not alter intelligence on the effect of economic sanctions against Iraq for political reasons. Much of the problem is laid to an omission in DCI Webster's testimony, further confused by press coverage and politics within Congress.

Lee, William T. Understanding the Soviet Military Threat. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1977.

A former CIA analyst wrote this critique of U.S. estimates during a particularly important and politicized moment in U.S. intelligence history. Lee argued that previous estimates erred on the low side. (See Items 153, 155, 174, 176.)

Pipes, Richard. "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth." Commentary, 82 (October 1986), 25-40.

The head of Team B (actually, there were several B Teams), gives his views on the origin of and need for the exercise, and the controversy that followed. Pipes sees rather far-reaching consequences of the effort in competitive analysis. (See Items 167, 175.)

Prados, John. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence and Russian Military Strength. New York: Dial Press, 1982.

Relying solely on open sources, this is a useful history and analysis of the estimative process vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Price, Victoria S. The DCI's Role in Producing Strategic Intelligence Estimates. Newport, RI: Center for Advanced Research, The Naval War College, June 1980.

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are "the DCI's papers to the President." This is an extremely useful analysis of the roles played by successive DCIs (through DCI Turner) on strategic estimates of the Soviet Union. Also details changes in the organization and management of the estimative process.

Reich, Robert C. "Re-examining the Team A-Team B Exercise." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 3 (Fall 1989), 387-403.

An even-handed and useful synopsis of the controversial competitive analysis exercise. Reich sees much more limited results than did Team B leader Richard Pipes (see Item 164; see also Item 175). Includes a helpful bibliography.

Scalingi, Paula L. "Intelligence Community Cooperation: The Arms Control Model." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 5 (1991-1992), 401-410.

A former CIA analyst discusses the organizational intelligence responses to the demands of arms control in the 1980s, including interagency strains, albeit with a bias in favor of her former agency.

Turner, Stansfield. "Intelligence for a New World Order." Foreign Affairs, 70 (Fall 1991), 150-166.

Former DCI (1977-1981) offers his views for issues intelligence should concentrate on in the aftermath of the Cold War, as well as proposals for reorganizing the community.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. History Staff. Mary S. McAuliffe, ed. CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962. Washington, D.C., 1992.

A broad range of declassified intelligence documents (National Intelligence Estimates, cables, meeting memoranda, etc.), related to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Gives a good feel for the role played by intelligence in this crisis and senior policy and intelligence officials interacted.

U.S. Centra! Intelligence Agency. History Staff. Scott A. Koch, ed. Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959. Washington, D.C., 1993.

Twenty-seven declassified estimates on the Soviet Union (internal politics, global plans, strategic capabilities). Beyond showing degree of accuracy in these estimates, this also provides insight into the development of the overall estimative process.

U.S. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Intelligence Support to Arms Control. Report together with Dissenting Views. 100th Congress, 1st session, 1987 [House Rept, No. 100-450],

A useful examination of one of the most important and controversial policy issues for intelligence. The two sets of views expressed in the report also give a good feel for how larger political views can affect the perception of issues and the role played by intelligence.

U.S. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978. 96th Congress, 1st session, 1979.

An extremely important, incisive and scathing review of the NIE process, centering on Iran as the Shah's regime collapsed. The report concluded that, as a useful intelligence product for policy makers, "the NIE is not worth fighting for."

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Estimating the Size and Growth of the Soviet Economy. Hearings, 101st Congress, 2d session. July 16, 1990.

Coming at the end of the Cold War, a variety of government and non-government experts assess one of the key Coid War analytical issues: the size of the Soviet economy and the amount of effort devoted to Soviet defense. (See Items 153, 155, 163, 176.)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives. 95th Congress, 2d session, 1978.

An analysis of the controversial "competitive analysis" between CIA group (Team A) and outside experts (Team B) on the Soviet Union. The Senate committee found problems in the NIE process and saw the value in competitive analysis, but felt the alleged political biases of Team B led to a flawed experiment. (See Items 164, 167.)

U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO]. Soviet Economy: Assessment of How Well the CIA Has Estimated the Size of the Economy. GAO Report NSIAD 91-274. September 1991.

In assessing perhaps the central analytical issue of the Cold War, the GAO found that CIA used acceptable economic models that may have been inapplicable to the unique Soviet economy, resulting in an overly large estimate of its size. (See Items 153, 155, 163, 174.)

Wirtz, James J. "Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War." Political Science Quarterly, 106 (1991), 239-63.

A detailed refutation of Sam Adams's charge (see Items 152, 178) that political necessity resulted in lowered CIA estimates of North Vietnamese strength.

Wirtz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.

A detailed and trenchant analysis of U.S. intelligence shortcomings leading up to the Tet offensive, putting heavy onus on analytical mindsets, commanders' responses to warnings and the dissemination of warnings. (See Items 152, 177.)