ABSTRACT
Fundamental to any consideration of freedom and necessity is our understanding and interpretation of the world around us. Given the complexity of that world, it is hoped that our task will be greatly simplifi ed if we fi rst consider a plain object of modest form and substance. Our inquiry thus begins with an inanimate physical object, a commonplace thing, a chair. Two concerns guide us. First, what is this inanimate physical object before us? That is, what type of a thing is it and how does it come to be this type of a thing? Second, in what sense does the notion of freedom pertain to a chair? That is, can the qualities that make a chair a chair independently establish the identity of a chair or is a chair’s identity determined by conditions external to a chair? In the case of an inanimate physical object such as a chair, we refer to freedom from external determination as autonomous determination. Freedom in this sense is not limited to a notion of self-volition or free will. Freedom here suggests autonomy from external conditionality. Let us proceed then with our inspection of an ordinary object (a chair) and its capacity to be free.
