ABSTRACT
There are two possible reasons for punctuated equilibrium (PE) findings in the distribution of the sizes of changes in annual budgets: institutional friction and cognitive overload. We investigate government spending in France and present strong evidence that the cognitive explanation is more powerful than the institutional one. We look at the history of French state spending since 1820 and more detailed spending patterns for seven ministries since 1868 (and for three additional ministries since 1947). In every case we find similar results, showing the signature pattern of high kurtosis that is characteristic of a PE process. The findings provide strong support for the cognitive friction model developed by Jones and Baumgartner (2005) for the United States (US) case. The similarity of findings in France to what was found in the US is remarkable. The similarity of the results we show across historical periods in France during which institutional structures were dramatically different suggests that institutional procedures are less important than cognitive factors in explaining the friction model.
