ABSTRACT
This chapter presents an extended account of Nietzsche’s perspectivist epistemology and the conception of the self on which it is based. This task is necessitated by the inadequacy of previous accounts of Nietzsche’s perspectivism in the philosophy of education literature, which have misconstrued the doctrine as a variety of epistemic relativism and, consequently, an outright rejection of any distinction between “truth” and “lies” (Ramaekers, 2001; Aviram, 1991). By offering an in-depth engagement with Nietzsche’s central published formulation of perspectivism, the famous section 12 of Nietzsche’s third essay in On the Genealogy of Morals, as well as an extended account of Nietzsche’s conception of the self, this chapter shows that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is much more akin to epistemic realism than epistemic relativism. As such, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is supposed to guide his readers – and, by extension, educators – to adopt only those perspectives that are likely to increase their and others’ flourishing.
