ABSTRACT
The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was a major threat for the sustenance of détente. Helmut Schmidt's interest in the maintenance of the political and humanitarian gains of Ostpolitik for the German people was the major motive for his opposition to sanctions. Schmidt was particularly scared over the potential for crisis escalation in East-West relations. In January 1980, Egon Bahr argued that the stabilization of the crisis in the Persian Gulf region was in fact a precondition for the resolution of the crisis in East-West relations. Schmidt's and Giscard d'Estaing's February 1980 declaration was a friendly way to resist sanctions, to avoid public debate and to show solidarity with the United States. Schmidt's relationship with Brezhnev was an asset in the effort to cope with the manifold dimensions of crisis. In early 1980, the USSR was about to finalize its new five-year plan, and Soviet authorities had to calculate the amount of the envisaged gas deliveries.
