ABSTRACT
This chapter begins with a brief review of key elements of Robert Kane’s libertarian theory of free will and then moves on to explain and respond to various criticisms of the view which have appeared in the literature. It is argued that various criticism made by Neil Levy, Meghan Griffith, Randolph Clarke, and Alfred Mele can be answered without making much, if any, significant alteration to Kane’s view. In the later stages of the chapter it is argued that the irrationality problem raised separately by Randolph Clarke and Laura Ekstrom as well as Ekstrom’s concerns about the phenomenology of free willed choice raise significant challenges for the Kanean view. It is argued that despite his efforts to answer these worries, they continue to present serious challenges to his theory. These problems with Kane’s view result from his contention that in self-forming acts we engage in dual efforts of will in the moments leading up to choice.
