ABSTRACT
This chapter explicates and defends a virtue ethical view about the relation between virtue and the ethics of roles. I shall defend what I shall call an Integrationist view about this relationship according to which role-obligations are not reducible to or derived from obligations of virtue in general but nor are they sui generis. Rather such obligations are constrained by virtue in what I call role-differentiated virtue.
I address one problem in developing a virtue ethical account of role ethics namely: What is the relation between expertise and virtue in role ethics? I argue against the view that practical wisdom embraces the expertise necessary for ethical competence in general, particularly in discharging role responsibilities. With illustrations, I claim therefore that practical wisdom is insufficient for role virtue, and specifically for performing right action within roles. For role expertise, which differs from practical wisdom, is necessary. This view is maintained within a certain virtue ethical conception of role ethics. On that conception virtue is necessary for ethical competence in a role, and practical wisdom is necessary for virtue.
