ABSTRACT
The “content view” (CV) holds that while the sensory-phenomenological properties of conscious thoughts can float free from their intentional content, both their cognitive-phenomenological and rational properties are essentially connected to their intentional content. This paper defends CV from some objections raised by Goff (2018), Pautz (2013) and others, via consideration of some “mix-and-match” cases (i.e., Goff’s term for circumstances in which sensory-phenomenological, cognitive-phenomenological, and rational-cum-causal/functional properties are mixed and matched in various ways). The plan is as follows. §2 demarcates sensory phenomenology from cognitive phenomenology. §3 outlines and motivates a certain view of the relationship between thoughts’ cognitive-phenomenological properties and intentional content. §4 lists and clarifies the kinds of properties being tested for modal independence. §5 presents four mix and match cases and argues that they are unproblematic for CV.
