ABSTRACT
Chapter 7 argues that Ford’s and Kissinger’s attempts in January and February 1976 to blame Congress and put them on the defensive for the defeat in Angola was flawed and unrealistic. In the aftermath of failed discussions with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow in January 1976, Kissinger and newly appointed African Bureau chief William Schaufele strongly argued that it was vital that the US stay involved in Angola. However, during a series of Congressional hearings on the issue, the Ford administration was consistently unable to adequately explain its reasoning, with Congressmen and Senators consistently comparing the situation with Vietnam. It concludes that Kissinger’s inability to successfully articulate a defence of his Angolan policy was mainly due to the fact that the US had no real African policy and, therefore, he was not adequately prepared to make a case which incorporated Angola at the heart of the discussion instead Cold War rivalry.
