ABSTRACT

This chapter argues Avicenna's distinction between property as a quality inhering in an object and predicate as a logical category; this distinction is made quite explicitly by him and it is mentioned by scholars who have worked on him. It shows that Avicenna distinguishes between meanings on the one hand, and logical items or constructs on the other, and shows that the constituent elements of our domain of discourse according to Avicenna are logical constructs. The chapter determines how this bipartite distinction between logical constructs and other items compares with a tripartite distinction between natural, mental and logical entities. It determines how, given that our domain of discourse consists of logical entities, one proceeds to construct one's logical system. The chapter addresses the persistent problem of the function of knowledge and of truth in the Avicennian system. Are the objects of their knowledge logical constructs? What would it mean to say that their knowledge of them 'is true'?.