ABSTRACT
This chapter tries to bring together a synthesis of Avicenna's logical, ontological and epistemological theses as the author has presented them in this work. It highlights the wedge Avicenna drives between our knowledge and the world, and which makes an empirical verification of our knowledge impossible. The chapter addresses a fundamental Avicennian thesis that was first pointed out by A-M. This synthesis, which now the author presents as his theory of Providence, and for which he has painstakingly prepared the grounds in his logical and other works, may be Avicenna's unique contribution in this part of Metaphysics. The chapter considers more closely in what a process of making things distinguishable consists, and in what way Platonic Forms are the same or not as the pure intelligibles Avicenna seems to be talking about here. It shows that how reality is not what authors come to cognize, and how their objects of discourse are perforce constructs rather than real objects.
