ABSTRACT
In the now classic Kindly Inquisitors, Jonathan Rauch writes that, “knowledge is painful. . . . [It] does not come free to any of us; we have to suffer for it” (125). Often when educators try to shield students from this pain, they compromise the attainment of knowledge. In this essay, I will examine the connection between offense (pain) and practical knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding ethics, politics, public policy, etc.). With the assistance of Millian principles, I argue that it is not just empirically unlikely that one will acquire practical knowledge by avoiding offense—rather, I advance a stronger conclusion—that it is conceptually impossible to both acquire such knowledge and to avoid offense.
To know something requires that one be familiar with, and perhaps even seriously entertain, falsehoods. With practical fields, not only must one entertain false propositions but one also must (conceptually) entertain value systems that one finds flawed/perverse. To fail to do so, would deny one practical knowledge, even including knowledge of values he/she currently endorses (via a Millian dead dogma).
Recently, Wellesley professors wrote, “We are especially concerned with the impact of speakers’ presentations on Wellesley students, who often feel the injury most acutely and invest time and energy in rebutting the speakers’ arguments. . . . What is especially disturbing about this pattern of harm is that in many cases, the damage could have been avoided” (email, 3/20/17) (emphasis added). This chapter will show that this is not merely wrongheaded (i.e., unlikely to attain knowledge) but it also entails an impossibility. There is no possible world in which one can possess practical knowledge without encountering offense. I’ll show that to avoid the latter necessarily entails that one forgoes the former.
