ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to distinguish “academic freedom” from “freedom of speech,” using “civility” to set an additional constraint on speech which occurs in academic settings; (2) to define civility in relation to platform privilege such that it can perform this function; (3) to describe the ethical-epistemic duties of academics, by arguing that with epistemic privilege, speech acts incur particular responsibilities. I argue that academics, and those invited to speak on university campuses, are exceptionally situated as knowers within the epistemic community, since they have “platform privilege,” which consists of (a) being able to access a variety of platforms that are not available to others and (b) accessing platforms that reach larger audiences. They are also afforded a “credibility excess,” that is, an overestimation of their testimonial value. This credibility excess differentiates academics from non-academics in the epistemic community, and when it is combined with platform privilege, the potential for harm as a result of speech that is false, misleading, defamatory, oppressive, or dangerously incendiary warrants careful regulation. In other words, I show that credibility excess and platform privilege incur risks that demand modulation of speech. I therefore argue in favor of the disciplining of academics who engage in speech that is harmful (in the sense of being marginalizing) and similarly, in favor of no-platforming practices for external speakers.
