ABSTRACT
Whether there are any substantial merits of theorizing “non-Western” International Relations (IR) and what such a theory would (or should) look like are topics of a heated debate in contemporary IR. Such a remarkable interest in “non-Western” (or “post-Western”) IR theory is largely derived from apparent concerns about American and Western dominance of the field and the corresponding marginalization of IR studies produced outside the West (Acharya, 2010, 2014). Moreover, the growing body of literature on non-Western IR theory often begins with an expressed discontent with the explanatory utility of existing mainstream IR theories, namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism, all of which have Western origins or orientations in their conceptual, theoretical, and normative foundations. China’s rise has added a certain momentum to attempts to develop new or indigenous theoretical frameworks. Despite such a meaningful (and overdue, to some extent) debate over IR theory in the context of the “non-West,” however, both advocates and critics alike do not properly address more acute issues associated with non-Western IR theory building, namely theoretical pluralism, and fragmentation. This chapter suggests that there are (at least) three sets of questions that need to be pondered more fully in the discussion of non-Western IR. First, does IR need pluralism? Second, to what extent has contemporary IR become pluralistic? Finally, should IR pursue the promotion of dialogue and engagement across theoretical and geographic divides? Without addressing these vexed questions, any attempt to argue either for or against the development of non-Western IR theory is likely to be inchoate, for what is at stake in the issue of theoretical pluralism and fragmentation constrains and facilitates the non-Western IR theory-building enterprise.
