ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a philosophical discussion of T. Nagel, J. P. Sartre and L. Cowan’s writings about sadism. It focuses on the split that might be generated in one’s intimate life in response to a paraphilic sexual preference. The chapter discusses a case of paraphilia, masochism, using E. Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Perversion is a psychological phenomenon rather than a physiological one because if sexual desires were equated to physiological phenomena like hunger, then anything could be sexual and anything could be considered perverted. Hence perversion, as much as any sexual phenomenon, finds its roots in our psyche rather than in our body. If Nagel’s analysis of perversion implies a pessimistic view about the possibility of people who enjoy perversion to live a psychologically fulfilling life, Sartre’s judgment is even stronger. Cowan’s position toward paraphilia is less negative than Sartre’s and Nagel’s positions.
