ABSTRACT
This chapter concentrates on one of its principal architects, namely Debreu, especially his 1959 monumental Theory of Value. It shows how that Debreu's formalist conception of theoretical economics as an applied mathematical discipline has little in common with Walras' conception of applied mathematics. The chapter discusses Weintraub's challenge to investigate 'how economics has been shaped by economists' ideas about the nature and purpose and function and meaning of mathematics'. It focuses on Debreu's own philosophy of economic analysis. The chapter presents a very preliminary account of some of the central methodological claims. It explains how Debreu articulates the limitations of the contingency approach to economic theorising. The chapter engages dual process. Firstly, in light of the formalist school's distinction between pure and applied mathematics and its commitments to the values of generality, rigour and simplicity. Secondly, philosophies of mathematics to that of the formalist school to raise some critical questions vis-a-vis Debreu's own philosophy of economic analysis.
