ABSTRACT
The reforming measures of Edward Cardwell, Secretary of State for War, 1868-74, are best seen as a belated response to the glaring deficiencies in the organization of the British Army as revealed by the Crimean War. Indeed, Cardwell's ministry is in some ways the culmination rather than the initiation of a period of military reform. The chapter discusses that Cardwell's organizational reforms, though well-intentioned, contained certain flaws at their launching and in practice simply did not work, so that the charges brought during the Crimean War, were still true in 1904 after the South African War. Criticism of army organization will rightly be regarded as so much hot air unless its weaknesses are made apparent in war. In any case, the extent of Cardwell's personal responsibility is a mere debating point, whereas the continuing inefficiency of army organization in the period 1874–1904 most certainly is not.
