ABSTRACT
This chapter deals with various issues and debates pertaining to moral realism. Realism positions are themselves quite diverse, and are typically divided into versions of naturalism and non-naturalism. One version of anti-realism holds that there simply are no moral facts at all. Traditional non-cognitivist–as well as error theoretic–positions are usually associated with this claim. Such a denial of the existence of moral facts is the most straightforward way of being a moral anti-realist, but it is not the only way. Stating Harman's argument the explicitly helps to distinguish different ways in which defenders of moral realism might respond. According to the meta-ethical position known as theological voluntarism, God is the basis for all of morality. The connection between theological voluntarism and the topic of evil can be explored in many ways, but one prominent approach has been through the lens of the Euthyphro Dilemma.
