ABSTRACT
[16] Tactical Dysfunction in the AEF, 1917-1918 TACTICAL performance in the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I did not always match tactical pronouncements and intentions. Some historians have recently taken an increasingly critical view of this problem, particularly focusing on the doctrinal, organizational, and operational shortcomings of the AEF.1 James Rainey, for instance, has demonstrated how the unsettled, “ ambivalent” tactical doctrine in the AEF, based partly on the “ open warfare” pronouncements of John J. Pershing and partly on the trench warfare experiences of the Allies, led to inadequate training and ultimately to failures on the battlefield. This lack of a sound doctrine, that sought to adjust organization, equipment, and tactics, to overcoming the stalemate on the Western Front, was a significant shortcoming that adversely affected American effectiveness in France. It was but one of several factors, however, that coalesced in 1917 and 1918 to determine how American troops fought and how well they performed. The ideas and self-perceptions of the officer corps of the U.S. Army, as well as pressures from the French and British Allies, helped shape American tactics. Battlefield performance was also directly affected by Army personnel practices, by the individual and unit training system in the United States and France, and by logistics and support afforded American combat units.
