ABSTRACT
On 4 March 1975, the Communist People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched the final campaign of its 30-year war with an attack on South Vietnamese positions in the Mang Yang Pass in the Central Highlands. The PAVN campaign relied instead on deception, diversion, surprise, an indirect approach, and alternate objectives—in short, a highly cerebral strategy. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam which confronted PAVN in early 1975, however, was no paper tiger. Even though PAVN knew it had regained the strategic initiative in South Vietnam, the General Staff's initial plan was quite cautious because PAVN still had to contend with a number of serious problems. Giap's original instructions included the requirement that PAVN forces in North Vietnam be prepared for the possibility that the offensive might provoke a renewal of United State bombing of North Vietnam or even a hostile amphibious landing on the North Vietnamese coast.
