ABSTRACT

There are certain undisputed practical lessons that can be drawn from the long history of American involvement in Indochina's affairs, but most of these are of an operational character—those relating to the techniques and technologies of warfare—and as such lie outside the realm. In 1983, the knowledgeable George K. Reedy, once press secretary to President Lyndon Johnson, blamed the ignorance of Americans, from the President on down, for the errors that were committed in Indochina. Insofar as Mr. Nixon and Ambassador Kirkpatrick are distinguishing the moral difference between the Indochina regimes the United States backed and those backed by the adversaries, they are undoubtedly correct. Comparing Indochina to Central America, E. Robert While, a former ambassador to El Salvador, told a conference on Vietnam in 1983. Vietnam only raised the question of whether the American people are prepared to take on a major fight—to undergo suffering, sacrifices and casualties—if vital national interests are not at stake.