ABSTRACT
The model of network capitalism raises the question as to whether it is possible or not to maintain the advantages of close cooperation within a network while reducing the harmful consequences of distrust in the relations between networks. In other words, the research problem is as follows: is the State as the holder of ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence’ (Weber, 1968, p. 54) able to play a leading role in the enforcement of the contracts between networks? This problem has no general solution. In Chapter II.3, §3 we have shown that the State’s representatives can participate in local networks and, consequently, lose their impartial status. It is necessary, as a result, to study the particular institutional environment in which the State becomes a disinterested third party in contracts. We will start our discussion by describing the functions of the State in the market play (§1). Particular attention will be paid to the issues of property rights that are in keeping Chapter II.4. Then we will turn to the institutional environment motivating the State’s representatives to perform such functions (§2). The third section will be devoted to the methods for making an empirical analysis of the State. In conclusion, we will enumerate some elements of the political economy of democracy (§4).
