ABSTRACT
Ross and Green both accept the basic correlativity claim, as do most contemporary rights theorists. Given that it is shared, it might seem that the basic correlativity claim cannot help enlighten people about their dispute over the recognition thesis. Although externalist accounts of moral motivation certainly have supporters. They deny what Michael Smith has called a 'platitude' about morality: that morality is part of practical reason in at least the weak sense that an ideally rational agent, who was aware of all the reasons for action that there are, would necessarily have motivating reasons to act on his moral obligations. Although, of course, Green did not identify himself as a moral internalist his account of moral obligation and motivation belongs to the family of internalist theories. According to Green, morality is practical insofar as terms such as 'ought' and 'right' only get their meaning when they enter into the practical guidance in people's dealings with each other.
