ABSTRACT

This chapter discusses an explication of T. H. Green's view of freedom, beginning with the category of "freedom to" followed by that of "freedom from". The distinction between negative and positive freedom has been part of contemporary political discourse for a generation. Green offers two arguments against negative freedom with regard to the category of "freedom from". The first asserts that the absence of external coercion is compatible with the failure to attain freedom as self-realization; the second maintains that internal as well as external impediments can thwart the development of the capacities of will and reason. For the liberal holder of the negative conception of freedom, coercion alone is the legitimate obstacle to freedom. The chapter points that the distinction between externality and internality of freedom captures Green's concept of freedom much more adequately than does the negative/positive distinction. Green's understanding of freedom as internal and external ability poses a triple challenge to traditional liberal distinction between freedom and ability.