ABSTRACT

Russian domestic politics has long been both labyrinthine and pragmatic, at once both inordinately complex and breathtakingly dynamic. The same can be said of Russia's foreign policy, in particular in relations with former Soviet republics. Any study of Russian foreign policy comes back to the intriguing question of why Russia, long perceived as an inveterate imperial power, would refuse to take back a handsome portion of its former empire - a portion that offers a bridge to Europe and an advantageous geostrategic position. Despite formal declarations, Russia has made little progress in achieving union with its ex-Soviet neighbour, Belarus. Linking Russia's foreign policy to its domestic politics, Alex Danilovich clarifies this paradox and explains why specific attempts to reunify Russia and Belarus failed, contrary to the desires of significant forces on both sides and to certain theory-based expectations.

chapter |10 pages

Introduction

part 1|20 pages

Explaining Foreign Policy — Domestic Politics Linkage

part 2|80 pages

Integration under President Yeltsin

chapter 2|16 pages

The 1994 Monetary Union Treaty

chapter 5|11 pages

The 1997 Union Treaty

chapter 7|16 pages

The 1999 Union State Treaty

part 3|51 pages

Vladimir Putin and Integration

chapter 8|13 pages

Facing the Ballot

Russian Presidential Election 2000

chapter 10|17 pages

Integration: Business as Usual

chapter |8 pages

Conclusion