ABSTRACT
Critics of liberalism commonly lament liberalism's fascination with rights. The usual plaint is that rights are too fiercely individualistic constructs, and that the liberal dependency upon rights ultimately portends disaster for social relations. Liberals conceive of rights as critical elements in the constitution of individual freedom. The choice theory has been the subject of extensive criticism, and in fact Hart himself partially repudiated the idea as an all encompassing theory of rights. To the extent that people are prepared to admit the existence of group rights, then one fundamental sense in which rights may be conceptualized in collective terms has already been established. In differing ways, nineteenth-century thinkers John Stuart Mill and T. H. Green brought together ideals which contemporary rights critics and proponents often view as essentially in opposition. In the past several decades, we have been witness to an unparalleled degree of, and appreciation for, analytical rigor in the specification of legal concepts.
