ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the complexity and contestedness is probably inevitable. It focuses on the 'acquisition' and 'property' questions, and return to 'just terms'. The chapter shows that the moral dimension of property rights is considerably more complex than asking whether a Bill deprives a person of their property without providing compensation. It provides an outline of what the changes might be and of the challenges that remain. The chapter forms part of a project on Australian parliaments and human rights which the author pursuing with Carolyn Evans and Kristen Walker. It considers three options for the high court: to reconceptualize s. 51 (xxxi) in light of its original intended scope and purpose, to adopt a process-oriented approach or to embrace a moral. The chapter also argues that in deliberating on s. 51(xxxi) cases, members of the court should openly expose the moral values that drive the dispute. Section 51(xxxi) is 'construed liberally as befits a constitutional guarantee'.
