ABSTRACT
Richard Posner claims attempts to establish natural–law jurisprudence are 'not logical'. Thus efforts to establish scientific principles are 'not logical' either. None of Posner's charges against natural–law jurisprudence carries any weight, even within Posner's pragmatist viewpoint. Posner might respond that he is only doing what Hume and others have done throughout history, namely, rejecting logic in the realm of values while retaining it for epistemological and scientific purposes. Posner's point that natural–law arguments are 'not coherent' is redundant, since coherence is determined by means of logic. Posner's description of his intuitions as 'undislodgeable at the time' is a neat bit of rhetoric, but not very comforting. Richard Rorty and Posner, like so many other radical skeptics, are unable even to doubt what they doubt, since they undermine even their capacity to engage in intellectual destruction, let alone any constructive work.
