ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author looks at the dilemma evoked by post-mortem pregnancy from the standpoint of the pregnant woman. He examines whether a pregnant mother owes a duty to save the life of her fetus and to provide its well being. The author follows Immanuel Kant's notion that an act is morally praiseworthy only if done neither for self-interested reasons nor as a result of a natural disposition, but rather from a duty. He analyses the special relationship between the mother and the fetus from four related ethical theories: ethics of relationships, responsibilities to society, ethics of families, and ethics of care. The author also shows how responsibility to society in general, and to social entities, like families, in particular, constitutes a moral duty towards the fetus. The idea that duties can be derived from relationships between different creatures implies that moral responsibilities are neither corollaries of moral principles nor are they structured intuitively as 'rules of thumb'.
