ABSTRACT
The patron-client model actually afforded legitimacy to Spain that needed it as much as any Third World dictatorship. Despite the internal debate about the degree of Spain's western integration as a means of stabilizing the currency and modernizing the economy, Franco had no alternative but to accept integration under the patron-client relationship. Though the United States and UK backed Spain's bid for European Economic Community membership at the Council of Europe in September 1961, Franco's human rights record made it very difficult defending the regime without appearing pro-Fascist. Confronting inflation and stagnation in the late 1950s, Spain accepted International Monetary Fund conditionality to qualify for more International Financial Institutions and commercial loans. As part of a stabilization deal, in March 1966 Spain signed an agreement with the United States and the aid consortium. Stabilization did not have much impact, and as expected labor carried the burden of the sacrifice, with the consequences of higher unemployment and more social unrest.
