ABSTRACT
Like the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates basin has been a cradle of civilization. Its history until 1914 seemed secure. The Sunni Ottoman Empire of Turkey and the Shiite Safavid Empire of Iran had settled their frontier zones with the Kharun River and a few o f the Tigris’ tributaries remaining with Iran. The last serious challenge to Ottoman control of the basin was the Egyptian invasion of Syria and Ottoman Anatolia by the independence and modernization-minded Ottoman governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali in the 19th century. With the eruption of World War I, the picture changed dramatically. The war finalized the destruction o f the Ottoman order and led ultimately to the establishment o f a Kemalist state in Turkey. Kemalism is an unusual form of nationalism. Whereas in other nationalisms, the state is created through an appeal to some elements of cultural commonality, Kemalism seeks to have the state impose commonality. Consequently, groups that do not conform must either be assimilated or marginalized demographically. World War I also altered Turkish views o f the Arabs. Turkey had to share the Tigris-Euphrates basin with two new states, and instead of being the prophet’s people, Arabs became, for many Turks, traitors. The last Ottoman ruler of Syria did a great deal to harm the reputation o f Turkey in the Arab world through deportations, massacres and agricultural policies resulting in starvation. The well o f friendly, neighborly relations between Syria and Turkey was poisoned long before it was dug. Turkey is attempting to “solve the Kurdish problem,” by economically integrating the Kurds into Turkey through the Southeast Anatolia Program (GAP in Turkish). The policy also has the not co-incidental side-effect o f depriving Syria of water by greatly reducing the flow the Euphrates into that country. Turkey’s motives in both instances are intimately tied with its nationalities policy. Turkey precluded any attempts to divide the water on the basis that “it is Turkish water.” The country’s refusal to negotiate with Syria is rooted in its rejection o f the outcome o f World War I, especially with regard to the Arab role in that war. The Turks’ attitudes towards Arabs are so profoundly negative that cooperation is very unlikely. Furthermore, Syria was left with no choice other than using the Kurds against Turkey in order to induce cooperative behavior in Ankara. Syria itself is extremely weary o f Turkey and shares some views with Greece and Armenia regarding that country. So, it cannot, at this time, negotiate with Turkey in good faith.
