ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the negative view has difficulties in deriving adequate conceptions of a free person by taking an aggregate of free actions. It considers various attempts to reconcile the conflicting liberties of people, from natural right theories, to utilitarian and social contract views and also argues that the 'measurement' of the freedom of a person is very difficult, if not impossible, because of the incommensurable criteria of freedom. After showing the inadequacy of Stemer's and Oppenheim's evaluations of the notion of a free society, the chapter focuses on another attempt, as hinted by Hayek, that grounds free society on voluntary exchange relations and freedom of contract. Comparisons between freedoms of different people and societies require that there are some criteria to pass from freedom of actions to freedom of persons. Oppenheim accepts that freedoms of different societies are not comparable because each system creates some liberties and restricts some others pertaining to different types of action.
