ABSTRACT
Skinner's simple but inspirational framework on rural marketing was widely applied in developing countries during 1970s. Skinner's attempt to generalise rural market evolution, however, has oversimplified China's situation. The separation of rural market change and its economic and social context has generated a sense of environmental determinism. Skinner's over-generalised description has weakened the portability of his model beyond the Imperial period. Skinner aligns China's policy changes with the country's rural market development using a policy cycle theory. The persistence of government regulation in Deqing reflects the significance of political factors in China. While economic reform has weakened the state's central control, that of local governments has been reinforced by the decentralisation of power. The inadequacy of Skinner's framework has not only challenged the legitimacy of grand theories, but also the application of Western hypotheses in China. The joint functions of the 'invisible wall' and the 'invisible hand' in Deqing and Dongguan suggest that a hybrid market system has been formed.
