ABSTRACT

This chapter shows that the Bilderberg discussions on decolonization did provide a much-needed forum to air grievances, and focuses on the difficult political implications of the colonial question in most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. As George Ball argued at Barbizon, the Bandung conference was partly a reaction to the habit on the part of the NATO countries to consult with each other before dealing with developing countries. Consequently, the Eisenhower Administration had to navigate between the 'Scylla' of Third World anti-colonialism and the 'Charybdis' of Western European interests and NATO cohesion. Starting in the second half of 1954, transatlantic differences over decolonization became more important because of two related developments. On July 26, 1956, Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in response to the sudden Anglo-American decision not to fund the Egyptian Aswan Dam. The problems in the Middle East and North Africa brought out into the open again the transatlantic and inner-European differences over decolonization.