ABSTRACT
A key argument in the literatures on collaboration and deliberative democracy is that, in order for such processes to be constructive, participants need to set aside, or at least minimize, coercive inducements. Coercion, it is argued, expresses mistrust and uncompromising self-interest, attitudes at home in distributive bargaining, but at odds with the good-of-the-whole ethos that is supposed to guide collaborative and deliberative democratic processes. This chapter argues that in situations where one of the parties represents the interests of a population that possesses inferior socio-structural power than the other party or parties, constructive collaboration is made possible, not by the less powerful party setting aside coercion, but by her making its use a continuous implied threat, and the demonstration of her capacity to make good that threat through its occasional well-disciplined exercise. Put differently, it is argued that actors advocating for the interests of socially less powerful populations contribute constructively to collaborative problem-solving and deliberative democratic processes.
