ABSTRACT

Chapter 3 argues for the Normative Competence Account. It states that an action that is performed for a normative reason is a manifestation of a normative competence. This complex competence consists of epistemic, volitional, and executional sub-competences. The agent is disposed to represent normative reasons correctly, to be motivated to do what represented reasons favor, and to execute that motivation by doing what the normative reasons favor. These dispositions are tracking dispositions that may be triggered by indicators of normative reasons. Consequently, the reason is tracked by the action but need not stand in a causal connection to the action. These considerations are inspired by Virtue Epistemology and undermine the causal account of the basing relation and the causal account of action. Finally, the normative competence is defended against objections of over-demandingness and under-demandingness. It is not triggered by a volitional state. The Normative Competence Account is compatible with the view that dispositions are primitive (metaphysical dispositionalism) and shown to be superior to causal accounts with reference to deviant causation. However, it is likewise compatible with a future sophisticated causal analysis of the relevant dispositions.