ABSTRACT
Normative reasons are not identical with motivating reasons. They are individuated in different ways than motivating reasons. Instead, the normative reason dispositionally determines both the motivating consideration and the action that is performed for it. This enables a form of non-accidental correspondence: The deliberative motivating reason is the content of a descriptive belief of the agent that represents the normative reason. The explanatory motivating reason is the non-psychological explanans of a dispositional explanation that refers to normative reasons, namely of a normative competence explanation. This view is compatible with the psychological account of action: there may be additional psychological explanatory motivating reasons. The Normative Competence Account provides the dispositional background for the relevant dispositional explanation by normative reasons. It thus combines the worldly picture of normative reasons that is prominent in normative theory with many insights from traditional action theory. It offers a naturalistic picture of how our mind interacts with normatively relevant features of the world around us such as to deliver normatively appropriate action.
