ABSTRACT
Chapter 4 explores the moral psychology of agents and argues that agents may act for a normative reason in a way that is reflective of normative insight and paradigmatically relies on the use of normative theory, the use of normative concepts, ought beliefs and enkrasia. Accordingly, they act for normative reasons by conforming to the arguably Kantian ideal of agents who are motivated by their correct understanding of their obligations. Alternatively, however, agents may act in a less reflective way without using normative concepts or even when performing akratic action. They are motivated by intrinsic desires for the good that reliably dispose them to do what reasons of a certain kind favor. This way requires instrumental rationality but is compatible also with akrasia. Both ways complement each other and constitute virtuous action either in the sense that the agent manifests intellectual virtue or in the sense that the agent manifests more traditional virtues like beneficence. The more reflective way can be defended against the objection from moral fetishism. Both ways account for the idea that the agent deserves credit for doing what the normative reason favors and can be understood as constituting moral worth.
