ABSTRACT
Chapter 7 explores the ontology of reasons and argues that the Deliberative Identity Thesis is false: the motivating consideration (or the agent’s reason, or the motivating reason in the deliberative sense) is not identical with a normative reason when the agent acts for the normative reason. Both the motivating consideration and the normative reason may be referred to as the reason that p, but the motivating consideration is individuated in as fine-grained a way as the Fregean proposition that p, whereas the normative reason that p is individuated as coarse-grainedly as the state of affairs that p or as an event. These different forms of individuations preclude identity. The motivating consideration is a premise in reasoning, namely the content of a belief. It is not, by contrast, the coarse-grained object of a belief because it reflects the perspective of the agent. The normative reason is a fact in the world that is represented by a belief and constitutes its truth-maker. This view is supported by arguments form commonsense ways of counting and weighing reasons, among others. The normative reason is related to the motivating consideration by a relation of correspondence that is non-accidental because it is established by an epistemic competence.
